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ment and the tort of outrage.
Appellant Vietta Steele appeals from an adverse judgment
in the trial court, claiming that it was prejudicial error for the
trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the statutory defense
to the charge of criminal trespass, contained in Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-206(4)(1978).

Appellant seeks a new trial on the basis of

that error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's Statement of Facts ignores the cardinal
rule of appellate review that the record will be reviewed in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court.
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); Hutcheson v.
Gleave, 632 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1981); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah
2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).

Indeed the Statement of Facts set

forth in appellant's brief only recites that evidence which
allegedly supports her claim of error and ignores material evidence
which supports the trial court's decision.
an independent basis for affirmance.

This has been held to be

Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande

Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984).

The following statement of

facts simply directs the court's attention to those facts which
clearly support the trial court's finding in favor of respondent.
This case arises from the events surrounding appellant
Vietta Steele's ("Steele") long-time friendship with a man named
Zenon Dompor ("Dompor").

Dompor was an elderly patient at the Aspen

Care Center ("Care Center"), a privately owned and operated skilled
nursing home facility in Ogden, Utah.

(R.912-913)
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Steelefs attorney reflecting Mrs. Steele had been at Aspen Care
Center causing disturbances involving Zenon Dompor and requesting
her to stay away and refrain from causing further disturbances or he
would be forced to obtain a restraining order.

(R.624, 892)

Steele had recently visited Dompor at the Care Center and caused a
disturbance which upset Dompor.

(R.893)

The Care Center believed

it was "detrimental to [Domporfs] well being11 for Steele to continue
visiting, and therefore requested Havas to send the letter.

(R.893)

An officer at the state Ombudsmen's office also requested that Havas
write the letter.

(R.893)

Dompor told members of the Care Center

staff in June of 1984 that he did not want Steele to visit him.
(R.776)
Just past noon on October 22, 1984, the appellant Vietta
Steele marched into the Aspen Care Center with a tape recorder in
hand and walked over to visit with Mr. Dompor.

(R.632)

Two Aspen

Care Center employees (Jolene Anderson, a Social Work Designee and
Debbie Hill, a Medical Records Clerk) separately asked Mr. Dompor if
he wanted to be visited by Mrs. Steele and he replied no.

(R.780,

805) In addition, Dompor had come to Hill earlier that morning,
before Steele's arrival and crying, told Hill that Steele had
visited him the night before and that he did not want to visit her
any more.

(R.775)

"after his money."

Dompor told Hill that he was afraid Steele was
(R.775)

Jolene Andersen and Debbie Hill each asked Mrs. Steele
several times to leave but each time she refused.

(R.786, 804, 823)

They called a policewoman who also asked her to leave and she

refused.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The. trial court properly rod uned f lu.» requested

instruction

bee a\ jse there was no substant iaJ evidence to support either element
of the defense.
I
was "of- ope.--

Thf" ev i dvnc v i.h w". r one Luwively f. hat the Care Center
> the public so far as appellant Steele was concerned.

-0-

Steele knew she had been prohibited from entering the premises, and
Dompor had told Care Center employees that he didn't want to see
Steele.

She had been requested by Domporfs attorney not to visit

him and by representatives of the Care Center to leave and by the
officer to leave.
II.

The evidence also demonstrates conclusively that

Steele's presence substantially interfered with the operation of the
Care Center.

Testimony showed that Dompor was emotionally upset

about Steele's prior visits and that her presence on October 22,
1984, further upset him emotionally.
ARGUMENT
The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether it was
error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the
statutory defense to the charge of criminal trespass which is
contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978). The trial judge
instructed the jury that if they found that Steele would have been
guilty of criminal trespass, she could not recover on any of the
civil causes of action alleged.

If the trial court had instructed

the jury regarding the statutory defense, and the jury had found the
defense applicable, Steele may have obtained a favorable verdict on
her civil claims.

Steele, therefore, claims that she was prejudiced

by the trial court's refusal to instruct on the statutory defense
which reads as follows:
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this
section:
(a) That the property was open to the public
when the actor entered or remained;
and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially
interfere with the owner's use of the property.

-7-

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978).
It is well established in Utah law that a party is
entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if
there is any substantial evidence to justi fy such an instruction.
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977); State v. McCumber,
622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980); See also wJ tters v. Querry, 626 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah 1981).

However, where the evidence provides no

reasonable basis to support the instruction, a trial court's refusal
to give the instruction is not reversible error.

Dixon v. Stoddard,

627 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1981); Powers v. Gen je's Bldg. Materials, Inc.,
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977).

In additioh, even where the failure

to instruct may have been error, if it appears that the outcome of
• j

the trial would not have been affected by giving the requested
i

instruction, failure to instruct is not prejudicial error.

State v.

Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985); Stftte v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186,
188 (Utah 1977).
The question whether this instruction was properly
refused, therefore, requires an analysis of whether there was any
substantial evidence to justify an instruction on the defense.
defense has two elements.

The

A jury when giv^n an instruction on this

defense, must find that (1) the premises were open to the public at
the time of the alleged trespass, and (2) the person's presence did
not substantially interfere with the owners use of the property.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978) . Unless both of those elements
are established, the defense is not available to the appellant.

The

-o-

sufficiency of the evidence as to each element of the defense is
discussed below.
POINT I.
OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
The Utah Supreme Court has not interpreted the phrase
"open to the public" as contained in §76-6-206(4).

Therefore,

reference must be made to the decisions from other states which have
interpreted that phrase in the same context.

In State v. Ocean, 24

Or.App. 289, 546 P.2d 150, 152 (Or.Ct.App. 1976), the Oregon Court
of Appeals interpreted the phrase "open to the public" as it is
found in Oregon's criminal trespass statute.

In that case, the

defendant had received written notice from Fred Meyer Corporation
prohibiting him from entering any Fred Meyer store without the
permission of an officer of the corporation.

Despite this pro-

hibition, defendant entered a Fred Meyer store and was charged with
criminal trespass.

The defendant claimed his entry was not unlawful

because the store was "open to the public" at the time of his entry.
In deciding the meaning of the phrase "open to the public," the
Oregon court referred to the statutory definition of that phrase as
contained in Or.Rev.Stat. §164.205(4)(1953), which definition reads
as follows:
"Open to the public" means premises which by their
physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice
or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time
would cause a reasonable person to believe that no
permission to enter or remain is required."
Under Oregon law, as under Utah law, a person is not guilty of

-9-

unlawful entry if the premises are open t<j) the public at the time.
See State v. Taylor, 17 Or.App. 499, 522 P.2d 499, 500-501
(Or.Ct.App. 1974).

However, the court held that because the

defendant had been prohibited from entering the premises of any Fred
Meyer store, he was "not a member of the general public to whom the
premises were open, even during business qours."

State v. Ocean,

546 P.2d at 152-153.
Applied to the facts of this casle, the above interpretation of the phrase "open to the public" yields the same result
here as in Ocean.

Steele had received a 1!etter from Mr. Domporfs

attorney requesting she not visit Dompor.

According to her own

testimony, Steele understood that she was prohibited from entering
the Care Center premises and that she did
enter the premises on October 22, 1984.

ot obtain permission to
According to the testimony

of Debra Hill, Jolene Andersen, and Officet Ann Grotegut, Steele was
asked repeatedly to leave the premises and!each time refused.

In

light of this evidence, it is clear that Steele was not a member of
the general public to whom the Care Center was open.

Further-

more, there is more reason in this case tolhold that the premises
were not open to the public than there was in Ocean.

In that case

the premises involved were that of a Fred Meyer retail department
store.

A retail store extends a broad invi tation to the general

public to enter its premises, to look, and to buy its products. A
nursing home such as the Care Center, maked no such invitation.

On

this basis alone, the court may find that qhe Care Center was not

i
open to the public when Steele entered its (premises on October 22,

-10-

1984.
However, there is an additional basis such a finding to
support such a finding.

Domporfs election on the basis of his right

as a patient at the Care Center supports the determination that the
Care Center was not open to the public so far as Steele was
concerned.

Dr. Breinholt, the owner of the Care Center, testified

that as a condition of the patients1 participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, the Care Center is required to establish
certain patients' rights.

See 20 C.F.R. §405.1121 (K)(1977).

A

copy of the rights adopted by the Aspen Care Center is marked as
Exhibit "ll-D" at trial and is a part of this record on appeal. A
much larger copy of that list of rights was posted in the lobby of
posted in the lobby of the Care Center in October of 1984.

One of

those rights reads as follows:
"The patient has the right
communicate with persons of
(See Exhibit "ll-D").

to associate
his choice

and
"

The evidence shows that Mr. Domporfs attorney

advised Mrs. Steele by letter not to visit him at the Care Center.
In addition, Mr. Dompor told Care Center employees Debra Hill and
Jolene Anderson on more than one occassion that he did not want Mrs.
Steele to visit him.

By prohibiting Steele from entering the

premises, the Care Center simply enforced Dompor!s right.
This evidence clearly shows that the Care Center was not
"open to the public11 on October 22, 1984, so far as the appellant
Vietta Steele was concerned, and that there was no substantial
evidence to support the instruction.

Since both requirements of
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§76-6-206(4) must be met to establish the statutory defense the
defense must fail, and this court should $ffirm the trial court's
ruling that the instruction was not warranted.

However, even if the

court should find that the Care Center was open to the public to
Mrs. Steele on October 22, 1984, the statutory defense is still not
available to Steele because her conduct substantially interfered
with the owner's use of the premises.
POINT II
SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE
The statutory defense contained jin Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-206(4)(1978) requires as its second element a showing that
"the actor's conduct did not substantially! interfere with the owners
use of the property".

As with the first element of this defense,

there is no Utah Case law which explains wqat substantial
interference means in the context of this Statute.

In addition, a

search of the case law in other states reveals no definition of
substantial interference in the context of a criminal trespass.

The

question whether Steele's presence at the (tare Center substantially
interfered with the operation of the Care Center must, therefore, be
decided on the basis of logic and sound rea*soning, in light of the
practical realities of nursing home adminisitration.
To substantially interfere with the operation of a nursing
home facility, the person's conduct must constitute such a burden
upon the operation of the facility that the! owner is unable to carry
on the operation in a reasonably safe and proper manner.

To operate

a nursing home facility in a reasonably safp and proper manner, in
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this context, means to be able to assure the patients' reasonable
protection from disturbing and upsetting influences.

To achieve

that protection, the administrator of a nursing home facility must
be able to control the environment within the facility.

That

includes the right to prohibit certain persons from visiting that
facility who are likely to disturb or upset a patient.

The patient

himself, may certainly request that such persons be prohibited from
entering the premises if that patient does not want to visit those
people.

See State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888-889 (Minn. 1981)

(resident has the right to determine who he may associate with).

In

addition, the administrator of the facility has the discretion to
prohibit such visits if in its judgment those visits would adversely
affect the physical or emotional health of the patient.

This

is the proper standard to determine whether Steele's conduct
constituted substantial interference in this case.

This court

should adopt that standard in deciding whether the second element of
the statutory defense is met.
As measured by that standard, Steele's conduct on October
22, 1984 substantially interfered with the operation of the Care
Center, and the second element of the statutory defense is,
therefore, not met.

The evidence shows that Dompor, his attorney

and the Care Center had requested that Steele not return to visit
Dompor.

According to the testimony of Care Center employees, Dompor

was emotionally upset by Steele's visits.

Shortly before Steele's

arrest, Dompor approached Care Center employee Debra Hill about
Steele's visits.

Dompor was crying and emotionally upset.

He told

-13-

Hill that Steele had visited him the night before and that he did
not want her to visit him again.

Dompor tjiad expressed the same

concern some four months earlier and the Care Center sent the June
I
21st letter to Steele prohibiting her froni visiting Dompor. Mr.
I
Havas testified that when he visited Dompdr,
Dompor became
visibly
addition,
when Steele
upset at the mention of Steele's name. Injer arrest, Dompor once
arrived at the Care Center on the day of h|<
again told both Hill and Andersen that he ^lid not want to see
Steele.

Andersen and Hill testified that in their judgment Steele's

presence and the commotion she caused would adversely affect Mr.
Domporfs emotional condition.
On that evidence, it is clear that Dompor did not want Steele
to visit him.

It is also clear that in the Care Center's judgment,

Steele's visits were likely to further upset Dompor emotionally.
Steele's visits, therefore, constituted a Substantial interference
with the operation of the Care Center. Her visits rendered the Care
Center employees unable to protect Dompor flrom emotionally upsetting
On this evidence , all reasonable men must
I
conclude that there was no basis for a juryj instruction on

or disturbing influences.

§76-6-206(4)(b).

This court, therefore, shpuld conclude that the

requested instruction was properly denied.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied the jury instruction on
the statutory defense to criminal trespass $et

forth in Utah Code

Ann. §76-6-206(4)(1978). There was no substantial evidence upon
which to base either element of that defens^.

The evidence clearly
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established that the Care Center was not open to the public as that
phrase is used in the statute.

In addition, the evidence establish-

es conclusively that Steele's presence substantially interfered with
the operation of the Care Center.

Since there is no evidenciary

basis to support the requested instruction, the trial court properly
denied the same.
DATED this p^jjf

Aay of October, 1986.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
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M E D I C A R E / M E D I C A I D OPERATING STANDARDS
Skilled Nursing Facilities
405.1121 GOVERNING B O D Y AND MANAGEMENT, contd.
Interpretive Guideline*! [Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term tyre. June, 1975)
1. Policies and procedures recognize the needs of patients to have access to and maintain contact with the community of which they are a part and members of that community have
access to him.
2. Subject to reasonable scheduling restrictions, visiting policies and procedures permit patients
to receive visits from anyone they wish. A particular visitor may be restricted by the facility
for one of the following reasons:
a. The patient refuses to see the visitor.
b. The patient's physician documents specific reasons why such a visit would be harmful to
the patient's health.
c. The visitor's behavior is unreasonably disruptive of the functioning of the facility (this
judgment must be made by the administrator and the reasons are documented), this is
not intended to preclude those who, because they advocate administrative changes to protect patient rights, are considered a disruptive influence by the administrator.
3. Decisions to restrict a visitor are reviewed and reevaluated each time the patient's plan of care
and medical orders are reviewed by the physician and nursing staff or at the patient's request.
4. Space is provided for patients to receive visitors in reasonable comfort and privacy.
5. Telephones, consistent with ANSI standards (405.1134(c)), are available and accessible for
patients to make and receive calls with privacy. Patients who need help are assisted in using
the phone. The fact that telephone communication is possible, as well as any restrictions, is
made known to patients.
6. Arrangements are made to provide assistance to patients who require help in reading or sending mail.

(k)(12) May meet with, and participate in activities of, social, religious, and
community groups at his discretion, unless medically contraindicated (as documented
by his physician in his medical record);
!
Interpretive GoMttinatt [Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term Care, June, 1975]
1. Patients who wish to meet with or participate in activities of social, religious, or other community groups in or outside of the facility are informed and encouraged and assisted to do so.
(405.1131(b)).
2. All patients have the freedom to refuse to participate in these activities.

(k)(13) May retain and use his personal clothing and possessions as space permits,
unless to do so w o 0 infringe upon rights of other patients, and unless medically
contraindicated (as documented by his physician in his medical record); and
Interpretive Gakfettneet {Issued by HEWs Office of Long Term Carei June, 1975]
1. Patients are permitted to keep reasonable amounts of personal clothing and possessions for
their use while in the facility and such personal property is kept in a safe location which is
convenient to the patient.
2. Patients are advised, prior to or at admission, of the kinds and amounts of clothing and
possessions permitted for personal use, and whether the facility will accept responsibility for
maintaining these items (e.g., cleaning and laundry).
3. Am/pewoiiaJ ctothiM or poaaesrions retained by tn^
identified and recorded on admission and a receipt given to the patient. The facility if
reaponaible for secure storage of such Hems, and they are returned to the patient promptly
upon request or upon discharge from the facility.

(k)(14) If married, is assured privacy for visits by his/her spouse; if both are
inpatients in the facility, they are permitted to share a room, unless medically
contraindicated (as documented by the attending physician in the medical record).
I. 405.1 f21(k)(12)

^National health Publishing Corp., 1977

